1. Zeno’s Hypothesis:

Πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα (Parm. 127e1-2; cf. 127e7-8, 136a4-5)  
Beings are many

This is usually interpreted as

There are many

Zeno rejects the hypothesis and argues to

2. Zeno’s Conclusion:

Οὐ πολλά ἐστι (τὰ ὄντα) (Parm. 128b2)  
Beings are not many

This is usually interpreted as

There aren’t many things,

which is equivalent to

3. Parmenides’ Thesis:

Ἔν ἐστι (τὸ πᾶν)  
All is one  
or  
It is one

3a. Its Usual, Numerical/Existential Interpretation:

Only one being (real thing) exists

4. My Interpretation of Zeno and Parmenides:

4a. Each being is many things  
4b. No being is many things  
4c. Each being is one

5. Socrates’ Specification of Sensible Objects:

Ἐγώ καὶ σὺ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν (Parm. 128e8)  
I and you and the others we call many

4a. Its Traditional Interpretation:

I and you and the other things we call “many”

4b. The Interpretation I Propose:
I and you and the other things we call many things
I and you and the other things we call by many names
I and you and the other things that have many properties

6. Plato’s Understanding of “Is”:

Plato takes sentences of the form “a is E” e.g., “Charmides is beautiful,” to mean “a is what it is to be E,” that is, “Charmides is what it is to be beautiful”

7. Phaedo 102b8-c2:

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ἢ δ’ ὡς, ὡμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλλης ἔχειν; οὐ γὰρ ποιεϊκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τοῦτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ὡλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃς τυγχάνει ἔχων.

You agree that that Simmias is taller than Socrates is not in fact as we say in words because it is not in Simmias’ nature to be taller than Socrates in virtue of that—namely, in virtue of being Simmias—but in virtue of the tallness he happens to possess.

8. Why Charmides Can’t Be Beautiful:

Plato understands

Charmides is beautiful (when compared to human beings)

as

Charmides is what it is to be beautiful.

But it is also true that

Charmides is ugly (when compared to the gods)

And hence

Charmides is what it is to be ugly.

It is then true that

Charmides is both beautiful and ugly,

which, on Plato’s understanding of “is,” becomes

Charmides is both what it is to be beautiful and what it is to be ugly.

But since

What it is to be ugly is not what it is to be beautiful,

this, by the transitivity of identity, becomes

What it is to be beautiful is not what it is to be beautiful,

which is a real contradiction, and contravenes
8a. Parmenides’ Principle:

οὐ γὰρ μὴποτε τούτο δομὴ εἶναι μὴ εόντα (DK B7.1)

Never shall this be proved, that what is not is.

9. Plato’s Understanding of “Self-Predication”:

Plato takes sentences of the form “The F itself is F”, e.g., “Beauty is beautiful,” “Justice is just,” “Tallness is tall” to mean “The F itself is what it is to be F,” that is, “Beauty is what it is to be beautiful,” “Justice is what it is to be just,” “Tallness is what it is to be tall.”

10. Why Each Form Can Be Only One Thing:

Given that

Justice is what it is to be just,

it can be nothing else. For it were anything else, say, stable, as all the forms are supposed to be, then, in line with Plato’s understanding of is, it would also be true that

Justice is what it is to be stable.

But

What it is to be stable is not what it is to be just

and therefore

Justice—what it is to be just—is not what it is to be just,

which is impossible.

11. The Second Objection Against Participation in the Parmenides:

1. Οἴμαι σε ἐκ τοιούθεν ἐν ἵκαστον εἴδος οὐσθῆαι εἶναι· ὅταν πάλλ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι, μία τὶς ὀσώς δοκεῖ ιδέα ἢ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι. (132a1-4)

I suppose you think that each form is one from a consideration of such sort: when it seems to you that many things are large, it may be that there seems to be one idea, the same upon them all as you look at them, whence you take it that the large is one.

2. Τί δ’ αὐτό τὸ μέγα καὶ τᾶλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἕνωςαυτὸς τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τῷ αὐ μέγα φανεῖται, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι: (132a6-8)

What then if you look at the large itself and the other large things in your soul? Won’t another large appear in virtue of which all these appear large?

3. Ἀλλὰ ἃρα εἴδος μεγέθους ἀναφανῆσεται, παρ’ αὐτὸ ὑπὲ τὸ μέγεθος γεγονός καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῷ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτως αὐτὸ πάντων ἐποίησεν, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἰκαστὸν σοι τῶν εἰδών ἔσται, ἄλλα ἀπέρα τὸ πλῆθος. (132a10-b2)
Another form of largess will therefore emerge, in addition to largeness itself and its participants; and upon all those another, in virtue of which all those will be large; and your form

12. Soph. 251a5-6, b5-6

Γέγομεν δὴ καθ’ ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὄνομασι ταῦτά τοῦ τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεῦομεν . . . Ὄθεν γε οἴμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θείνην παρεσκευάκαμεν.