From Polemo and Crates to Arcesilaus: Revolution or Natural Transition?

It is convenient for the teaching of ancient philosophy that the Old Academy should terminate with Crates, and that a new Hellenistic phase should be ushered in by Arcesilaus’ revolutionary introduction of a distinctly Academic brand of ‘Scepticism’. It helps bridge the gap between the early precursors of Pyrrhonist Scepticism, i.e. Pyrrho himself and Timon, and the Pyrrhonist revival of Aenesidemus. And it supplies an ‘-ism’ to suit our modern demand for philosophic labels. It also gives colour and controversy to the increasingly pedestrian history of Plato’s school, something to which students will readily respond. It is convenient, but is it right? Clearly there were changes in the public face of the newly invigorated Academy, and I do not want to deny the credit for those changes to Arcesilaus. After all, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo had all stamped their own personalities on the Academy during the time of their leadership, but nobody had seen this as in any way illegitimate. The question that concerns me is whether such changes amounted to stasis.

The notion of a revolution within the school was developed by Antiochus and given its most eloquent extant expression by Numenius, who wrote a work on the Academic diastasis from Plato (frr. 24-28 des Places). What we have of this satirical piece is well worth reading, but it is based on the unhistorical notion of the fading of an ancient vision: the vision of Pythagoras, which Plato had somewhat ambiguously preserved for posterity, which the Old Academy had more or less clung to, and which Arcesilaus abandoned in favour of his sceptical strategies. Though Xenocrates and Speusippus were certainly interested in the connections between their own Academic heritage and the Pythagoreans, they surely saw their work as being that of building upon Platonic foundations and further advancing Platonic researches. The truth was not something that lay in the past, but something expected to emerge with greater clarity in the future.

Antiochus of Ascalon, known to us primarily through the philosophical works of Cicero, was not constrained by the same notions of ancient wisdom, but regularly drew the distinction between the Old Academy and the New, implying that
Arcesilaus’ innovations were so fundamental that with him the Academy ceased to be the school that it had once been. It was this claim that caused Philo of Larissa, then the Scholarch, to write his ‘Roman Books’ in which the notion of two Academies was attacked. The thesis is most simply put at Academica 1.13 (= TXXX), from which it is clear that Philo’s thesis responds to another claim that is already public, a claim that the Academy had, since Arcesilaus, abandoned the heritage of Plato. Claims of abandoned heritage always shock the leaders of established organizations, and it falls upon the official leader to respond. Antiochus’ response to Philo’s response was also one of shock (Acad. 2.11 = T.XXIX). Philo’s thesis was more radical than anything that Antiochus was used to hearing, even though few Academics could have willingly admitted that their school had ever abrogated its former heritage.

*Academic Continuity and Philo of Larissa*

That the school had some on-going mission, continuing from Plato down to Philo, is argued without obvious signs that the view is contentious, by Cicero at Ac. 2.7-9. These chapters detail no on-going school doctrine, for that would have been unthinkable for an orthodox Academic, but emphasize rather the intellectual freedom of the Academic tradition, a freedom that demands no adherence to a list of teachings. The validity of differences of opinion is forcefully maintained, the power of reason to guide is welcomed, and the aim is to get either to the hidden truth or somewhere close to it. The unity of the Academy is depicted as a unity of *culture*, which separates it from those schools whose rationale is rather the adherence to a set of doctrines.

This version of a One-Academy thesis is broadly correct. Speusippus felt under no obligation to adhere to doctrines bequeathed by Plato, differing sharply in both ethics and metaphysics. Nobody else felt an obligation to reproduce the system of Speusippus, and Xenocrates had doctrines of his own: though Xenocrates frequently resorted to the kind of mythical imagery that tended to veil anything distinctive in his views, for which reason he became a favourite of

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1 I include the references in Brittain’s collection of Testimonia, included as an appendix (Brittain 2001).
Plutarch's. Though Antiochus promoted the early successors, particularly Polemo, Numenius (fr. 24.6-12) will only admit that the basic character of the teaching remained broadly the same (αἱ ὑπὸς διετέιντο τῶν δογμάτων σχεδὸν δὴ ταύτῶν), insofar as ἐποχὴ and associated doctrines had not yet been introduced, allowing that by their omissions and distortions 'they did not stick to their initial heritage'. Numenius correctly saw these scholarchs failing to adhere to a received body of doctrine, but he was wrong in assuming that the Academy's heritage must be judged in doctrinal terms.

A revived Socraticism under Polemo?

As for Arcesilaus, he had for many years been prominent in the Academy before becoming scholarch somewhat unexpectedly, and there is no reason to assume that he saw himself as betraying his legacy. While he is sometimes seen as reviving the Socratic side of Plato, I believe that there was quite clearly a strong Socratic revival under Polemo. Like Socrates, Polemo made little lasting contribution to anything but ethics, and Socrates was seen as the archetype of the divinely-inspired lover-educator upon whom Polemo, Crates, and probably Crantor too saw fit to model themselves. Love was 'a service to the gods for the care and salvation of the young', according to an influential definition of philosophic love attributed to Polemo by Plutarch.2 Polemo himself remembered

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2 Plut. Mor. 780d; see Dillon (2003), 165; Plutarch uses of the imperfect tense, implying that it was a regular claim of Polemo, though in the context of Theseus and Romulus Compared (1.6) he used the same formula regarding Ariadne's heaven-sent love that preserved Theseus, treating it simply as a definition 'of the philosophers'. In the Life of Alcibiades (4) he uses the phrase without attribution to apply to Socrates' alleged love of Alcibiades, possibly influenced by the way it is characterised in the Alcibiades I. This concept of Socrates' is echoed at the beginning of Hermeias' Commentary on the Phaedrus (1.1-5): 'Socrates was sent down into generation for the benefit of the human race and of the souls of young persons. As there is much difference between souls in their characters and practices, he benefits each differently, the young in one way, sophists in another, stretching his hands out to all and exhorting them to practise philosophy.' While the key term σωτηρία is not used there, it appears later in the context of Socratic love (pp. 9-10), while at the same time answering the criticism that Plato here uses argument in utramque partem, not denying this, but rather explaining how such use can be directed towards the attainment of truth. Πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρὸς τὸν λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπαύθε Πλάτων τῶν ὀντικεμένων λόγων ἔξεταν πολεοδομὰ. Πρὸς δὲ τὸν οὐκ ἔχει τὸν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ υπὲρ δικαιοσύνην (4) ἐν Σοφιτῇ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μ. ὄντος καὶ νῦν οὐκ ζώον καὶ ζῶον ἐγγίζει πρὸς τὸ ὀνόμα τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπομαχόμενος, δεικνὺς ὅτι ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὸν ἔρως ἄλλος ὑφὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ μίας τὸν ψυχής ἄλλος γὰρ ἔστιν ὦ ἀλλὰ ἔρως, πολλῶν ἑυθύνες τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν (25) χορηγὸς καὶ ἀναγεννῶς τῶν ψυχῶν ἀναγεννῶς οὐν ἡ ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπ’ ἀμφῶν γεμίσας τοὺς περὶ ἔρωτος λόγους, ἐλέγχοντος τὴν (p.10) δόξαν τῶν πολλῶν, διὰ τὸ ἠγείροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπ’ ἀμφοὶ ῥέστει τῶν ἔρωτα.
the help and care that Xenocrates had shown when rescuing him from his dissolute youth.

Further, I have recently been examining another way in which the Academy under Polemo may have been reviving Socrates. A group of doubtful dialogues, comprising Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Hipparchus, Theages, and Minos (though probably not Erastae) shows common linguistic trends across a significant portion of each work that sets them apart from most unquestionably genuine material. I have identified 27 common words, whose use is not dependent upon the subject matter or the manner of presentation, which tend to discriminate between these works and genuine material. This vocabulary mix tends not to be found in every part of the work, so that the problematic dialogues may incorporate some genuine material, may be written in a register that minimises the differences, or may simply be better imitations of Platonic style. In a previous publication Terry Roberts and I argue that a group of such words much found in the relevant dubia had been increasing over time in Plato, and that another group seldom found in the dubia had been decreasing in late Plato. Hence if the common linguistic peculiarities are attributable to changing language within Academic circles, then we are almost certainly dealing with post-Platonic language. I do not believe that all show the hand of the same author, and I cannot insist that all were written under the same scholarch, but if I am right in suggesting that they are, in their final form at least, post-Platonic, then they testify to a revival of interest in the Academy in Socrates, Socratic search for definitions, the educational purpose of Socratic love, and the relationship between philosophy and power. I have previously argued that it is easiest to locate such a revival in the earlier years of Polemo's Academy. Here is just one example of the results of cluster analysis, in which the Minitab program

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3 The issue of the Erastae is harder to settle because of its narrative form, which seems to imitate that of Charmides and Lysis, making direct comparison with other dubia less reliable; its failure to name interlocutors is reminiscent of Hipparchus, Minos, and some of the spuria.

4 Both T-tests and the identification of the most important variables by factor analysis were employed for this purpose.


classified 500-word blocks\(^7\) from relevant dubia (with Erastae included), *Apology, Charmides, Laches, and Hippias Minor*,\(^8\) separating them into four clusters:\(^9\)

Table 1: distribution of 500-word blocks of selected dialogues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>no. blocks</th>
<th>clus1</th>
<th>clus2</th>
<th>clus3</th>
<th>clus4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alc1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alc2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hprch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erast</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theag</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apol</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrm</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HpMi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|             | Genuine    | Suspect  | HpMi   |       |
|             | 48         | 47       | 8      |       |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>clus1</th>
<th>clus2</th>
<th>clus3</th>
<th>clus4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genuine</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HpMi</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) The final block of any work may extend to 999 words.

\(^8\) The *Hippias Minor* behaves in different ways on different tests, and is not *assumed* to be genuine.

\(^9\) The analysis uses standardised data, 26 common words as variables, and Ward’s method.
Fig.1: Dendrogram of clusters 3, 2, and 4, analysis of 500-word blocks

And perhaps one more analysis should be offered, this time looking at 43 common words in the *Apology* and selected parts of the *Theaetetus* (B = 143d1-151d6; C = 151d7-164b12; G = 200d5-end), with just the *Alcibiades* dialogues, *Hipparchus, Erastae*, and *Theages*:
Already the least remarkable blocks have been separated off, including all 20 of *Apology*, all 5 of *Tht.B*, 3 of *Tht.C*, and 2 of *Tht.G*. All four blocks of the *Erastae* have also been separated off. The closely related clusters 9 and 10 are wholly devoted to the remaining material from *Theaetetus* (C & G), a dialogue that shows signs of having been revised, especially in its later pages where there are affinities with *Sophist*. Again, the closely related material in clusters 2, 3, and 6 contains 13 (of 20) blocks of the *Alcibiades I*, 5 (of 8) blocks of *Alcibiades II*, the fourth and final block of *Hipparchus*[^10] and two blocks (of 6) of *Theages*. While these tests can only demonstrate similarities, not authorship or date, some explanation needs to be offered for the ways in which parts of the dialogues from tetralogy IV.1 to V.1 (excluding *Erastae*) both stand out from most of the corpus and do so in similar ways.

While there is interest in these dubia in *elenchos*, in Socratic love, in searching for a definition, and in Socratic education more broadly, I see no interest in either argument *in utramque partem* or long-term suspension of judgment. They focus

[^10]: It should be mentioned that *Hipparchus* block 1 had been sufficiently anomalous to be allocated its own cluster 8, only very loosely attached to clusters 1, 4, 5 & 7.
largely on Socrates the helpful, insightful, often loving mentor, keen to employ conversation so as to discover and to communicate the truth, and not afraid to reveal what he believes. What is important is that it suggests an interest in the educational potential of Plato's earlier works in which Socrates learns along with his interlocutors, an interest that will be an important part of the background of Arcesilaus' rise to the scholarchate.

Whether or not it was as Socratic as I am suggesting, our picture of the Academy under Polemo is one of an extended family rather than of a doctrine factory. This seems to me to be appropriate, given that Plato himself was prepared to modify many of his views if not actually to reverse them. It would be unthinkable that Plato's legacy should have already become a fixed and immutable system, and I suspect that we may have come to exaggerate the extent to which Xenocrates' legacy involved the systematization of Plato. If he had tried, perhaps, to offer a schematic justification of the physics and metaphysics to which the Academy was heading in Plato's later years, this did not obscure the fact that there was another side of Plato to be explored, developed, and learned from. In short, the Old Academy could not have depended for its unity, like the Stoic and Epicurean Schools, upon any commitment to promote and build upon a single set of doctrines associated with its founder.

Doctrinal unity as a criterion of school unity
The problem for Philo was that by his day Hellenistic expectations of a School were imposed upon the Academy. The portrait of an Academy in revolt being promoted by Antiochus and Numenius was anachronistic, assuming that a school's identity must depend upon loyalty to basic tenets of its founder. *Academica* 2.7-9 offers a different kind of identity, but Philo had to do more. The Romans wanted insights into the great era of innovative philosophy, and into the most respected minds. Hence Cicero shows that they wanted Zeno, not Chrysippus; Aristotle, not Theophrastus; and Plato, not any subsequent Academic. If Philo, as scholarch, were to reconnect the Mediterranean world with Plato, he needed to claim more than adherence to a Platonic spirit of inquiry. And if being a *legitimate* successor was to mean much, he had also to claim that
Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Clitomachus were legitimate parts of that same tradition: to defend the on-going Academic tradition while persuading the Romans that Plato offered important lessons that he had the authority to place before them. *Academica* 1.44-46 would not suffice. So I am left with no full statement of Philo’s position, which Cicero was reluctant to endorse. We are left to piece it together out of fragmentary evidence, and to require that it must accord with Philo’s mature epistemology. We know it was controversial, and led to talk of a lie. Antiochus and others believed that Philo was lying not about Plato but about Plato’s recent successors (*Acad. II.12*):

&middot; minus enim acer est adversaries is qui ista quae sunt heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dicere.

That means that the One-Academy thesis of Philo was assimilating recent Academics with Plato rather than vice-versa. Philo’s epistemological stance was that things were not non-apprehensible in their own right, only when measured against the Stoic criterion (S.E. *PH* 1.235). And if they were not non-apprehensible then an Academic should not despair of apprehending some of them. Furthermore, if they did apprehend them they should surely have views of their own and give guidance where required. Philo needed a picture of the Academy that would not run counter to known facts about recent scholarchs, but one that would not represent the school as embracing ignorance. Such an approach would divorce this guidance from the public stance of the scholarchs, and a brief exchange with an imagined Philonian opponent at *Academica* 2.60 gives a polemical hint of a strategy. The Academics are asked what they have discovered. They reply that it is not their custom to reveal this. This draws a two-fold question from Lucullus: ‘What are these mysteries, or why do you conceal your view (*sententiam*) as if it were something disreputable?’ The former question goes unanswered, the latter is explained by the need to force pupils to use reason rather than authority.
It is usually assumed that the reference here to ‘mysteries’ is a malicious reference to secret doctrine,\textsuperscript{11} such that the Academic scholarchs could not have had if one accepts the evidence for Arcesilaus and Carneades. Yet the noun *sententia* is curiously weak for any quasi-religious doctrine involved in the promulgation of an Academic rite. The term ‘mysteries’ suggests above all arcane *practices*, of which something shown or taught would only be a part.\textsuperscript{12}

In fragment 21 of the *Academica posteriora* Augustine tells us that Cicero said the Academics ‘had had the habit of concealing their own view (again *sententia*), and not revealing it to anybody except those who had lived with them *right up to old age*. There could be a certain truth here, because we are well aware that Arcesilaus was brought up in an institution where the successor did live constantly with the scholarch (D.L. 4.22). Crates was being personally groomed for the job by Polemo, with whom he lived at the house of Lysicles. Arcesilaus, living rather with Crantor, was being groomed rather for the not insignificant role that Crantor was playing, a different role from that of the scholarch. It was not planned that Arcesilaus should take on the latter role, since Socratides was earmarked as Crates’ successor (D.L. 4.32); Crates, whose tenure of office was very brief, had not groomed Socratides for long enough. If only we listen the sources tell us which job Arcesilaus was groomed for and for a while held: it was keeper of Plato’s books: ο *kekthmēnos* τα *biblia* (D.L. 4.33), who would charge those wanting to read through the newly edited corpus (D.L. 3.66). And presumably the editing had itself been undertaken by whoever held that office.

I believe that we can easily name the first holder. Philip of Opus is credited with having prepared the *Laws* for publication after Plato had left them ‘malleable’,\textsuperscript{13} i.e. in an uncorrected and disorganised state (ἀδιορθωτός ... καὶ συγκεκυκυκώνευτος), since the dying Plato had not found time to put them together

\textsuperscript{11} Secret rites may be suspected of acting as a cover for base practices, as often in the Roman world.

\textsuperscript{12} This should be obvious if one compares Theon of Smyrna’s detailed depiction of philosophy as a sacred rite at *Intr.* 12-14. It is indeed the case that teaching will there be associated with the second of five stages, but rites involve preparatory stages, a stage of fulfilment, and further mechanisms by which those who have made the journey may hand the rite on to others. ‘Mysteries’ would primarily involve an Academic way of perpetuating the school’s heritage, a way that was hidden from the ordinary observer.

\textsuperscript{13} My translation of the phrase ‘in wax’ (ἐν κηρῷ, D.L. 3.37),
(προς το συνθείναι αὐτοῦ, anon. Proleg. 24.13-16). Philip's role regarding Laws is in fact perfectly captured by the term ἀναγράφεως applied to a figure usually held to be Philip in the Philodeman Index Academicorum (III.36). It is widely forgotten that this and the verb ἀναγράφω are primarily legal terms, applying to the making of official records or the promulgation of laws. Assuming that Philip himself wrote the Epinomis, as ancient tradition usually claimed, my methods of computational stylistics would make Philip rather than Plato primarily responsible for the working vocabulary of the books with most legislation in them. It was at first thought that there were three hands in the Laws, but careful separation of the technical language of legislation in books IV-VI and VIII-IX proved that it was the dominance of such language that accounted for the bizarre results that some portions of the later books (and all of XI) were yielding. Cluster analysis, again using Ward's method and standardised data (97 variables) produced the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book</th>
<th>No. of blocks</th>
<th>Plato cluster</th>
<th>Epinomis cluster</th>
<th>Legal cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1, 3, 4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 legal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1, 3, 4, 6</td>
<td>2, 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9legal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td>Myth and ending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 The general thrust of 24.13-16 is supported by the quotation from Proclus at 25.6-7; earlier evidence is found in Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 370f.
15 Plato uses the verb six times in the Laws, in the very books where legislation is most concentrated (VI 784c, d; VIII 850a; XI 917e; XII 947b), chiefly in the former sense, but otherwise only at Grg. 506c (‘enlist’) and Meno 83b (‘draw’).
16 As used for analysis across the Platonic corpus; however, by late works a very few of these words have dropped out of the commonest 300, and therefore no longer qualified as common vocabulary.
Table 2: cluster distribution of blocks of *Laws* and *Epinomis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XI</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>1, 2, 3, 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Books IV-VI, VIII and IX exclude legislative material placed in 'legal' files.

By comparison with works such as the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus* it was established that what I mark as the ‘Plato cluster’ is plausibly close to the vocabulary of late Plato more generally.¹⁷ My assumption is that where the style closely resembles the *Epinomis*, then Philip has had an important role in writing the material up, even though Plato may ordinarily have exercised final editorial control. Plato would then turn out to have personally written up the parts closest to his main interests (most of I-IV, much of VII on education, most of X on theology, and the end of XII on the Nocturnal Council), entrusting the writing-up of matters of practical legislation to Philip. This agrees well with the description of Philip as Plato’s ἀναγραφεύς, a word I translate as ‘promulgator’. Our picture of a work to which two hands contribute also largely agrees with the notion that

¹⁷ I exclude the bulk of the *Timaeus-Critias* which has been shown to be written in a distinctly different voice or register associated with myth: see H. Tarrant, E.E. Benitez, and T. Roberts, ‘The Mythical Voice in the *Timaeus-Critias*: Stylometric Indicators’, *Ancient Philosophy* 31 (2011), 95-120.
Plato never found time to organise it personally, and that Philip had to provide both editing and structure.

A perennial puzzle concerning Philip is why he should have been described as a Platonic ‘successor’ (διάδοχος τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ διδασκαλείου) in the anonymous *Prolegomena* (24.18). Could it perhaps be that this is not an erroneous reference to his having become ‘scholarch’ of the ‘Academy’ (words that are not in fact used), but a recognition that it was he who took over representing the now absent Plato? Philip had a role in assisting to promote the work of Plato by organising his latest endeavours, in offering some interpretative thoughts in the *Epinomis*, and more generally in explaining Plato (perhaps in an orientalising fashion) and supplementing his biography. Ultimately it is this kind of work that kept Platonism alive in antiquity. Activity centred as it is on Plato and his works is only thinly attested in the more substantial remains of the early scholarchs: Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo. An *Encomium of Plato* in the list of Speusippus’ works (D.L. 4.4-5) scarcely amounts to Platonic exegesis, while Xenocrates’ basic interpretation of the psychogony in the *Timaeus* (Mor. 1012d-13b = fr. 188 I-P) probably reached Plutarch via Crantor’s commentary, which Proclus declares to have been the first (in *Tim.* 1.76.1). There is no work devoted to Plato in Diogenes’ list (D.L. 4.11-14), though works devoted to Parmenides and the Pythagoreans do appear there. And Aristotle (*de Caelo* I.9 279b32 = Xenocrates fr. 153 I-P) and his scholiasts (frr. 155-7 I-P) make it plain that though Xenocrates and Speusippus maintained that the creation motif in the *Timaeus* was an expository device, they did so in the course of defending Plato in inter-school debate and rivalry, an activity that obviously suited the scholarch.

Though only nine fragments survive, we do find Hermodorus writing a book *On Plato* (fr. 7-8 I-P, cf. frr. 4-5), which was exegetical in nature, explaining the ‘Platonic’ theory of matter in detail and apparently with an eye on the *Philebus* (frr. 7-8). He is also associated with the dissemination of Platonic *logoi* (frr. 1, 3), which Cicero identifies with Plato’s books (fr. 2). The precise activities that led to

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the saying λόγοι ουν Ἑρμόδωρος are not recoverable, but somehow Hermodorus was trading in Plato. Perhaps Hermodorus continued Philip’s editorial activities, since it is after the first ἕκδοσις of Plato’s works that the ‘possessors of the books’ are reported to have charged fees to those wanting a complete reading of part of the corpus. And interestingly Hermodorus shared Philip’s mathematical interests and his interest in Zoroastrianism. Might there be a connection?

The next figure to work on Plato’s oeuvre was Crantor, as the first to be called his ‘exegete’ by Proclus. Certainly he is known to have had views on the nature of the Atlantis story, as well as various aspects of psychogony of the Timaeus. He may also have expressed views about the range of functions that a dialogue’s prooemion may have, and I suspect that he did so in relation to the Theaetetus.

Arcesilaus was his great friend, sharing his house (D.L. 4.22), according to tradition as his junior partner (ἔρωμεν). He seems to have worked further on writings begun by Crantor (D.L. 4.24, 32), and inherited his fortune (4.25). Whatever else happened, he ‘had come into the possession of Plato’s books’ (4.32), probably as a young man, and in my view at the death of Crantor around 290B.C. Though I read a lot into this information, no such statements are made regarding the scholarchs, and the ‘possessors’ are should not be identified with the scholarchs at D.L. 3.66 (from Antigonus of Carystus’ Life of Zeno).

It may be thought that all necessary organisation of the Platonic Corpus, as undertaken with regard to about one quarter of it by Philip, was completed long before Crantor arrived on the scene. However, my impression is that even Plato’s complete writings had been left in need of organisational work, not least because some had been left neglected while others existed in alternative versions. An ‘authorised version’ was required, which may well have left some authentic

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19 I believe that the corpus was at this time published in four groups of twelve books, with the Laws counting as twelve, and the Republic with Timaeus-Critias with another twelve.
21 This relies on a a very probable supplement at the equivalent point in Philodemus’ account.***
material from discarded versions outside the final corpus. Any difficulties with
the high-profile works would have been fixed first. Lower-profile dialogues of a
broadly ‘Socratic’ character would have been left until last, but once their serious
study began a new consciousness of the Socratic legacy would have emerged
among those most concerned with the public profile of the corpus, Arcesilaus
among them. Dialogues like Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras, and
Meno employed tactics, including argument pro and contra, which could
contribute to the Academic armoury. It was not contrary to Academic heritage to
employ them.

It is not clear what provision was made for any role inherited from Crantor when
Arcesilaus became scholarch, but we are told that, after Arcesilaus, Lacydes
handed the School down during his own life-time to Telecles and Evander, and
this may be further evidence of some kind of double tradition either persisting,
or being re-establised after Arcesilaus’ joint tenure. At any rate it was only
Evander who handed down the scholarch’s position to Hegesinus, from whom it
passed to Carneades. Carneades himself seems to have groomed Clitomachus for
the job (D.L. 4.67). As we draw closer to Cicero’s time there continued to be some
voice in the school to rival that of the scholarch, Metrodorus of Stratonicea being
sometimes opposed to Clitomachus.

I believe that it is largely to such a division of public and Platonic roles that Philo
had appealed in his One Academy thesis. It could be argued that Plato and
argument in utramque partem had always existed side by side in the Academy. If
Arcesilaus took this cautious approach somewhat further and refused to reveal
his own hand as scholarch at all, that was understandable, and the tactic had
good Socratic precedents. One can imagine that in old age he might have dropped
his guard and at least let his successor know of how he had been influenced by
the division of roles and even, to some degree, where he really stood on the key

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23 The first three are appealed to by Academic argument regarding Plato’s inclination to suspension of
judgment at anon. Proleg. 10.16-20; Neoplatonists insisted that the ultimate aim of such opposite
arguments was the truth (ibid. 10.22), and the tactic is used by Hermias in Phdr. 9.19-20 (πρὸς
eὐρέσειν καὶ βάσανον τῆς ἀληθείας). The position of Philo of Larissa was not dissimilar to judge from
Cic. Acad. II.7, II.60.
issues. The division between the public spokesman and Platonic teacher was still alive in Philo’s day, when Charmadas had certainly been teaching Plato’s *Gorgias* even though Philo is not known to have promoted Plato in any special way. The two are sometimes mentioned together as if they constituted the joint leadership of the Fourth Academy (Sextus *PH1.222 = T v, Eus. PE14.4 = T vii*). With the break-up of the School Philo no longer needed to keep the Academy’s long-standing arrangements, as he understood them, secret. So at Rome he finally explained. Antiochus, who had not loyally followed Philo long enough, never heard this before. Perhaps this reflected a decision on Philo’s part to avoid adopting Antiochus as his successor. Antiochus did not like what he heard, but this does not mean that it was wrong. Appeals to a secret tradition were always hard either to refute or to substantiate. In the tough world of Roman educational politics one believed them only if it suited one.

Believing in such a tradition has suited virtually nobody in modern times, but that is partly because it is seen as concerning esoteric *dogmatism*. Nobody ever made such a claim, only the claim that the public face of the Academy, as projected beyond its walls by the scholarch, did not reveal the full extent of its internal practices and of its commitment to what it saw as Plato’s heritage. The heritage did not consist of Transcendent Forms, the Idea of the Good, a God who is in some sense a ‘creator’, and a world-soul arranged according to principles of harmony. Its central commitment was to on-going inquiry, with a view to getting as close as possible to the truth, but with a commitment to constantly revisiting any conclusions that one had reached.