

**1. Zeno's Hypothesis:**

Πολλά ἐστί τὰ ὄντα (Parm. 127e1-2; cf. 127e7-8, 136a4-5)  
Beings are many

This is usually interpreted as

There are many

Zeno rejects the hypothesis and argues to

**2. Zeno's Conclusion:**

Οὐ πολλά ἐστί (τὰ ὄντα) (Parm. 128b2)  
Beings are not many

This is usually interpreted as

There aren't many things,

which is equivalent to

**3. Parmenides' Thesis:**

Ἔν ἐστί (το πᾶν)  
All is one  
or  
It is one

**3a. Its Usual, Numerical/Existential Interpretation:**

Only one being (real thing) exists

**4. My Interpretation of Zeno and Parmenides:**

- 4a. Each being is many things
- 4b. No being is many things
- 4c. Each being is one

**5. Socrates' Specification of Sensible Objects:**

Ἐγώ καί σὺ καὶ τᾶλλα ἃ δὴ πολλά καλοῦμεν (Parm. 128e8)  
I and you and the others we call many

**4a. Its Traditional Interpretation:**

I and you and the other things we call "many"

**4b. The Interpretation I Propose:**

I and you and the other things we call many things  
 I and you and the other things we call by many names  
 I and you and the other things that have many properties

### 6. Plato's Understanding of "Is":

Plato takes sentences of the form "a is E," e.g., "Charmides is beautiful," to mean "a is what it is to be E," that is, "Charmides is what it is to be beautiful"

### 7. Phaedo 102b8-c2:

Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι  
 λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ,  
 τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων.

You agree that that Simmias is taller than Socrates is not in fact as we say in words because it is not in Simmias' nature to be taller than Socrates in virtue of that—namely, in virtue of being Simmias—but in virtue of the tallness he happens to possess.

### 8. Why Charmides Can't Be Beautiful:

Plato understands

Charmides is beautiful (when compared to human beings)

as

Charmides is what it is to be beautiful.

But it is also true that

Charmides is ugly (when compared to the gods)

And hence

Charmides is what it is to be ugly.

It is then true that

Charmides is both beautiful and ugly,

which, on Plato's understanding of "is," becomes

Charmides is both what it is to be beautiful and what it is to be ugly.

But since

What it is to be ugly is not what it is to be beautiful,

this, by the transitivity of identity, becomes

What it is to be beautiful is not what it is to be beautiful,

which is a real contradiction, and contravenes

### 8a. Parmenides' Principle:

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ εἶναι μὴ εόντα (DK B7.1)  
Never shall this be proved, that what is not is.

### 9. Plato's Understanding of "Self-Predication":

Plato takes sentences of the form "The F itself is F", e.g., "Beauty is beautiful," "Justice is just," "Tallness is tall" to mean "The F itself is what it is to be F," that is, "Beauty is what it is to be beautiful," "Justice is what it is to be just," "Tallness is what it is to be tall."

### 10. Why Each Form Can Be Only One Thing:

Given that

Justice is what it is to be just,

it can be nothing else. For it were anything else, say, stable, as all the forms are supposed to be, then, in line with Plato's understanding of is, it would also be true that

Justice is what it is to be stable.

But

What it is to be stable is not what it is to be just

and therefore

Justice—what it is to be just—is not what it is to be just,

which is impossible.

### 11. The Second Objection Against Participation in the Parmenides:

1. Οἷμαί σε ἐκ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκαστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ιδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ιδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἡγή εἶναι. (132a1-4)

I suppose you think that each form is one from a consideration of such sort: when it seems to you that many things are large, it may be that there seems to be one idea, the same upon them all as you look at them, whence you take it that the large is one.

2. Τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτὸ μέγα φανεῖται, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; (132a6-8)

What then if you look at the large itself and the other large things in your soul?  
Won't another large appear in virtue of which all these appear large?

3. Ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα εἶσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν εἶσται, ἀλλὰ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. (132a10-b2)

Another form of largess will therefore emerge, in addition to largeness itself and its participants; and upon all those another, in virtue of which all those will be large; and your form

**12. Soph. 251a5-6, b5-6**

Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν  
... Ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν.