

rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Cicero, *Acad.* 1.17

Starting with Plato, a thinker of manifold variety and fertility, there was established a philosophy that, though it had two appellations, was really a single uniform system, that of the Academic and the Peripatetic schools, which while agreeing in doctrine differed in name.

T5 πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφηται δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν, [περὶ] πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν, οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθεῖς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτη καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου, ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως. S.E. *Adversus Mathematicos* 7.16

These thinkers (sc. Xenophanes and Archelaus), however, seemed to have handled the question incompletely, and, in comparison with them, the view of those who divide philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic is more developed. Of these Plato is potentially the originator, as he discussed many problems of physics and of ethics, and not a few of logic; but those who most explicitly adopt this division are Xenocrates and the Peripatetics, and also the Stoics.

'Old Academic' Ethics

T6 Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt, quae paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. *Fin.* 2.34

Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects (sc. of desire) were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus, arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics maintaining that the ultimate Good is to live in accordance with nature, that is to enjoy the first natural supplies with the use of virtue.

'Old Academic' Physics

T7 De natura autem ita dicebant (sc. veteres) ut eam dividerent in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens, eaque efficeretur aliquid. in eo quod efficeret vim esse censebant, in eo autem quod efficeretur tantum modo materiam quondam. Cicero, *Acad.* 1.24

In the domain of physics, they (sc. the ancient philosophers) divided nature into two principles, the one being the active, and the other the passive, out of which under the influence of the active force something comes to be. The active principle they deemed to be a force, the one acted upon a sort of matter.

T8 ὁ μέντοι Θεόφραστος τοὺς ἄλλους προΐστορήσας “τούτοις, φησίν, ἐπιγενόμενος Πλάτων, τῇ μὲν δόξῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει πρότερος τοῖς δὲ χρόνοις ὕστερος καὶ τὴν πλείστην πραγματείαν περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ποιησάμενος, ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀπάμενος τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας· ἐν ἧ δὺο τὰς ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλην ὃ προσαγορεύει πανδεχέξ, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ κινοῦν ὃ περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δυνάμει.” Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physica* CAG t.9 p.26.5-15 Diels=Theophrastus Fr. 230 Fortenbaugh et al.

Theophrastus, however, after giving his account of the other (natural philosophers), says: “After these came Plato, before them in reputation and ability though after them in date. He concerned himself chiefly with metaphysics, but also attended to phenomena, taking up the enquiry concerning nature; here, he wished to make the principles two in number, one underlying (things) as matter—and this he calls ‘receptive of all things’; the other being cause and source of movement, and this he attaches to the power of god and of the good”. (Trans. Fortenbaugh et al., 1992)

The prejudice of ‘dissensio’

T9 Verbi enim controversia iam diu torquet Graeculos homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis. *De Orat.* 1.47

Controversy about a word (sc. the orator) has long tormented those Greeklings, fonder as they are of argument than of truth.

Antiochus’ Peripateticism

T10 quod maxime efficit Theophrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur. quod si ita se habeat, non posit beatam praestare vitam sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio, quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Cic. *Fin.* 5.12

This effect is produced especially by Theophrastus’ book ‘On Happiness’ in which a large influence is allowed to fortune, though if his statements were true, wisdom would not have the power to ensure happiness. This is in my opinion a softer and more delicate view than is required by the power and dignity of virtue. So let us stick to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus, whose carefully written treatise on morals is indeed reputed to be by Aristotle, but I see nothing to prevent the son from having been like the father.

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